German reunification -- Inevitable, constructive and to be welcomed

Armin E. Mruck Professor of History Towson State University Tel: 330-2909 313-30-2266 German Reunif ica tiou--Inevitable , Constructive ted to be welcomed. Prime Minister Shamir of Israel is against it. He fears another Holocaust. President Bush favors it. So does with varying degrees the European Community which just has met in Strassburg. Chancellor Kohl presented to the German Bundestag a plan leading to Germany's reunification. Gorbachev still speaks of the reality of two German states. He indicated that a re-united Germany might mean his being replaced by a military dictatorship. Poles are concerned. Some 200,000 Germans of Leipzig demonstrate for German re-unification waving West German flags. Many pay lip service to German unity in the future without necessarily meaning it. One cannot deny an undercurrent of: apprehension , concern and even outright fear. The question which for many years had been merely theoretical now has become only too real: What to do about German reunification? Yet, no matter how wide the spectrum of opinions is, one needs to realize that for the first time since 1348/49 when Germany attempted to come together as a nation through a liberal and national revolution-~which failed--, there now is a grass-roots popular and growing movement towards national unity and some type of a common state. If one believes in the principle of self- determination then one must support the Germans' right to choose or not to choose national unity. Thus, for the Allies of West Germany and for the adherents of one of the important Western ideals of the 20th century, there is really only one course to follow, an honest and unequivocal endorsement of German unity, which now seems to be forthcoming by the Bush Administration. Should, on the other hand, the doubters of German's reliability as a partner within the European family, win out and attempt to hinder and/or delay a popular development, then the forces of the extreme right, the Republicans, will be strengthened. They v/ill maintain that the Germans were friends of the Allies only as long as it served the LJ.S.s and Nato's interests. Consequently, they-- the Germans--would have to realize that the only force they could rely on would be they themselves, thus changing a German and European peaceful revolution into a new German nationalism which might lead to the emergence of an independent and possibly hard to control newly isolated power and thus to potential unrest. One also needs to remind oneself of the frustration that Germans felt after the end of World War, I caused by disappointed hopes for a Fair Peace Treaty. Those hopes had been created through President Wilson's Fourteen Points which included the principle of self-determination of nations. I personally do not believe that this development towards a nationalistic, independent and isolated Germany will happen. But one must be aware of an even faint possibility of this